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INTRODUCTION
For Malawians 1992 was surely a year that they will never forget. Suddenly,
their small country, which had often been regarded as an island of political
stability in a turbulent region, won the attention of the international media
as its government and ruling elite tried to control a series of apparently
unprecedented events including public criticism by the major Christian
churches, industrial action, serious urban riots, student demonstrations,
armed robberies and the emergence of new domestic political groupings set upon
challenging the traditional supremacy of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). As
the government initially appeared to reel from one crisis to another it soon
became clear to most observers that whatever happened in the future a
watershed had been reached in the country's history. Indeed, one leading
opponent of the MCP declared during the year that Malawi had "reached a dead-
end; the country is at the crossroads of her destiny".1
That the regime in Lilongwe had in fact lost touch with the aspirations and
sympathies of its own people came as something of a surprise to many
commentators outside the country since much of the reporting about Malawi
prior to 1992 in the West had tended to enphasise Malawi's sound economic
performance and general air of good governance. Malawi, it was claimed, had
done "notably better" than many other African states.2 In 1989, for example,
the Americans agreed to cancel debts that Malawi had incurred because,
according to the deputy director of the US Agency for International
Development, the country "is looked upon as a leader in sub-Saharan Africa"
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and "one of the top countries in Africa in its commtment to the TMF-backed
structural adjustment programmes and its re-establishment of overall economic
growth".3 In fact, 1989 had been a good year for Malawi. The minister of
finance, Louis Chimango, was able to present an expansionist budget because of
an improved performance by the economy in 1988 while the immediate prospects
looked promising since in June at an international donors conference around
$555 million was pledged over the next two years.4 In addition. President
Randa had the satisfaction of receiving a series of influential visitors
including the then Prime Minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher, Pope John
Paul II, the archbishop of canterbury, and the president of Tanzania while he
also boasted to the world that his country had produced more maize than ever
before in recent times.5 For Banda and his regime, however, 1989 was a
turning-point in their fortunes even though they did not immediately realise
it as such since it saw the first signs of the collapse of the former Soviet
empire. As the Cold War slowly came to an end so one of the crucial
foundations of Banda's rule, the West's support for his regime as a bastion
against communism in the southern African region, rapidly became something of
an anachronism.
Banda's foreign policy had always been determined by what one observer of
Africa's dictators has called the "idiosyncratic variable"6; in other words,
Malawi's external relations were frequently conducted according to the
personal whims of its leader. Thus, Banda involved his country in territorial
disputes with both Tanzania and Zambia while he also seems never to have lost
sight of his ambitions for a "Greater Malawi" including part of Mozambique.7
At the same time his government had enjoyed close ties with South Africa since
the early 1970s in direct contravention of the prevailing mood throughout most
of the rest of independent Africa while Malawi was one of the "dominoes"
Kissinger hoped would not fall into the conmunist net after Washington's
humiliation in Vietnam.8 The Banda government, therefore, was a useful ally
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for the West, in the midst of the dangerously socialist "Front. Line" states of
southern Africa.
The extension of the Cold War to Africa lead to the emergence in the United
States and certain European capitals of a distorted image of Malawi. In
reality, of course, much of the material that was published on the country was
designed to portray Malawi as a loyal and worthy friend of the western
democracies. As one Malawian has cemented: "the strategic calculations of
the Cold War and the obfuscatlons of totalitarianism wrought by the West's
demon1sat ion of socialism could not... coincide with our understanding of
human rights".9 Added to this deliberate obfuscation of the truth was an
appalling degree of ignorance concerning all things Malawian that often
emerged within the western media causing the most basic of errors to creep
into the works of even so-called African specialists.10
Margaret Thatcher's "bizarre" visit to Malawi in 1989 was an excellent example
of the way in which the establishment in the United Kingdom offered Banda the
international respectability for which he had always craved. The visit was
fairly widely covered in a largely positive fashion in the British press which
tended to view the entire affair as a reward for Malawi's faithfulness to her
former colonial masters.11 What is more, Banda had always been able to call
upon influential and respected friends in Britain. Firstly, there were those
members of the Church of Scotland (which had enjoyed close ties with Malawi
for many years due to the activities of David Livingstone and a whole host of
subsequent missionaries) and others who allowed their memories of him as a
courageous African nationalist and distinguished medical doctor to blind them
to the fact that he had pursued authoritarian and increasingly oppressive
policies once in power in Malawi.12 Secondly, the Malawian leader also had
close links with certain powerful individuals within the British business and
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media world. For exanple, in June 1991 when The Observer printed an extremely
critical article on the Banda regime the editor of the paper was forced to
write "one of the most comprehensive apologies in recent [British] newspaper
history". 13 The reason for Banda's apparently ama2ing control over such an
important English periodical lay in the fact that the owner. Tiny Rowlands,
had substantial business interests in Malawi. Not surprisingly, therefore,
the editor was also compelled to include in the paper a piece entitled
"Malawi: "Oasis of Achievement1 in desert of the Third World".14
In reality, of course, Malawi had never been the success story that its
advocates, of whatever persuasion, made it out to be. Since full independence
was granted in 1964 the country had been dominated by one man, President
Hastings Kamuzu Banda. He returned to what was then Nyasaland in 1958 at the
request of the nationalist leaders within the country who believed that if
they were to succeed in their struggle against British colonial rule "a kind
of hero to be hero-worshipped" was necessary.15 Banda appeared to be the
ideal man to fit the bill since he was the leading Malawian of hie generation.
Moreover, he soon displayed an impressive grasp of political oratory so that
the MCP, with Banda as its undisputed leader, easily won elections in 1961.16
However, Banda soon clashed with the more radical members of his party leading
to what has become known as the "cabinet crisis" not long after Independence.
In effect, this marked a crucial turning-point In the development of the new
country for Banda was able to hold on to power in spite of the activities of
his critics, thereby demonstrating his authority and allowing him at the same
time to gradually stamp his own personality upon the infant state. The result
was a sort of feudal, African dictatorship which countenanced very little open
political debate and crushed any potential opposition often with a certain
degree of brutality.17
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The question of the Banda regime's brutality needs to be considered, however.
In the context of the ethnic diversity of what was, after all, an artificial
and virtually economically unviable colonial creation brought together within
tiny, arbitrary boundaries. Given such harsh realities it was probably
Inevitable that any post colonial government would have started to operate
along increasingly authoritarian lines in its quest to establish national
unity. With possibly eight to ten different language groups and sub-groups
Malawi presented a major challenge to any government. Moreover, such ethnic
diversity was Intensified by regionalism since the Tumbukas and affiliated
language groups constituted the majority in the north while the Chewas were
the predominant group in the centre and the Yaos, who were traditionally
muslims, dominated in the south. The situation was still further complicated
by the respective concentrations of the population with about half residing in
the south, roughly a third living in the centre and only about ten percent or
so present in the north. In addition, the colonial government had exploited
the south for cheap labour with the result that it remained comparatively
underdeveloped which had also been the fate of the north although the success
of Christian missions there meant that a disproportionate number of
northerners had access to education compared to both the centre and the south
of the country.18 Not surprisingly, therefore, the potential for regional and
ethnic tension was always, and indeed still remains, a very significant factor
in Maiawlan society.
As Banda grew older he became increasingly detached from his people and,
consequently, ever more vulnerable to manipulation by those around him. It
was under these circumstances that Cecilia Kadzamira, who attained the title
of Official Hostess to the officially unmarried Banda, and John Tembo, her
uncle, rose to positions of immense power and were able to fill many top
government posts with their relatives. With the creation of the Banda-Tembo-
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Kadzamira triumvirate the government's policies reflected a gradually greater
degree of "Chewa parochialism" - since all three came from the centre of
Malawi - involving Chichewa being prescribed as the national language/ the
implicit use of regional quotas in the civil service and a determined emphasis
upon the development of the Central Region at the expense of the rest of the
country.19 Naturally, deliberate attempts to favour the Chewa antagonised the
other ethnic groups in the country and helped to Intensify the already
existing forces for division and regionalism at work within the nation.
Perhaps inevitably, as a result, the mechanism of a one party-state, which had
been introduced along with a republican constitution and life-presidency for
Banda in order to ensure the regime's power base, became more and more
oppressive.
Economically Malawi reflected Banda's basic belief that his country should be
governed by an educated elite who would guide its affairs. Thus, he and
certain of his lieutenants owned most of the major businesses and agricultural
estates while 85 percent of the population continued to work on the land, many
as subsistence farmers.20 In the agricultural sector enphasis had been given
to the operation of large estates which enabled Malawi to achieve a grain
surplus in the mid 1980s and to score some apparently impressive successes in
the areas of tea, tobacco and sugar cultivation.21 However, one reason for
these encouraging performances was the extremely low wages offered to the
Malawian estate workers. In addition, the vast majority of the population saw
little, if any, of the profits created by these estates for as the World Bank
reported in 1989 Malawi remained one of the six poorest nations in the world
with a very high infant mortality rate, considerable malnutrition and a
worryingly low literacy rate.22
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The Malawian economy, therefore, was constructed around the enrichment of a
tiny elite while the rural peasantry saw few improvements in their basic
standard of living after independence. Moreover, during the 1980s strains
upon the economy such as the fuel crisis, a decline in domestic economic
expenditure, irregular weather conditions and the civil war in Mozambique
(which disrupted Malawi's comnunications to the coast and also caused the
influx of over a million refugees into an already crowded country) all
combined to place further pressure upon the meagre standard of living of the
majority of the population.23 Meanwhile, those in positions of power and
influence continued to enjoy lives of great wealth and privilege. In such a
harsh and stratified social environment tension began to build up and this
often manifested itself in small scale food riots and minor disturbances in
urban areas during the 1980's.
By the 1990s the Banda regime was facing a series of problems which appeared
to be insoluble. Firstly, the president himself was now probably in his
nineties and, in fact, seems to have suffered a stroke in 1990.24 Since the
ruling clique (dominated by Tembo who was frequently reported as being the
effective ruler of the country by sources outside Malawi since Banda's age, it
was argued, must have prevented him from participation in much of the regular
work of government) depended upon the president in order to legitimise their
authority his deteriorating health was clearly a real source of concern.
Secondly, as the Cold War faded Into the past so external pressure upon the
government intensified in the form of open criticism of Malawi's record on
human rights. Such criticism surfaced at the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting in Harare in 1991; a fact which was noticed with some enthusiasm by
exiled Malawian opponents to Banda's regime.25 At the same time potential
donor countries were already starting to lose patience with Malawi's failure
to seriously tackle its poor record on human rights and only the sudden
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release of political detainees terrporarlly staved off a significant reduction
in aid, although in November of 1991 the European Comminity agreed to set
strict political and human rights conditions for aid recipients in the
future.26 External pressure of this kind forced the government to suggest it
might consider the possibility of a multi-party system; but there never
appeared to be any real interest in such a scheme within the ruling
hierarchy.27 Even so, the dismissal of the secretary to the president and
cabinet, the senior civil servant in the country, during 1991 followed by
Banda's decision to reshuffle his entire cabinet suggested that the pressure
was starting to be felt within the heart of the ruling establishment in
Malawi.28
Meanwhile, there were signs from August 1991 onwards that Malawi would not
always be the easy country to govern that it had been in the past. Instances
of armed banditry started to occur in the Mulanje district and around Mwanza.
Buses were shot up and shops looted as Malawians with automatic rifles went on
the rampage. Speculation was intense in the country concerning the precise
causes of these attacks with some arguing that they were merely the result of
the general air of anarchy across the border in Mozambique while others
remained convinced that Malawian rebels were involved.29 There seemed, too,
to be a connection between these attacks and the numerous refugee camps
throughout Malawi which spelt trouble for a small country with a limited
security apparatus that had always tended to operate in the past on the
assumption that almost no Malawians owned firearms.
THE PASTORAL LETTER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: JANUARY - HAY 1992
In spite of the pressures that were clearly building up upon the Malawian
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government 1992 seemed to start peacefully enough. In January the United
Nations High Cormissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) earmarked 33 million US dollars
for the care of the Mozambican refugees in the country. Moreover, although
the president called upon his people to pray for more rain as drought began to
bite in February he still declared his annual crop inspection tour a success
and only brought it to an end on 9 March.30
However, both Inside and outside Malawi opposition to the Banda government was
gaining in confidence. The Law Society of Malawi had been active for some
time in discussing the legal rights of the individual citizen and was becoming
a group to be reckoned with partly because of its contacts in the UK and the
support of the American Embassy in Lilongwe.31 In addition, anonymous letters
started to be circulated inside the country often through the clandestine use
of fax and photocopy machines. One of these, sent to all government
ministries and institutions in February, effectively outlined the popular
dislike of John Tembo, who had become the minister of state. Tembo, it was
claimed, had made himself chairman of eleven major organisations while
continuously "struggling and scheming for power".32 A second letter declared
that the Banda regime was "making new martyrs every day" and had allowed the
country to fall into serious difficulties because of the activities of Tembo
and Kadzamira.33 The strong element of condemnation of these two powerful
individuals in the anonymous epistles reflected the general concern that with
Banda possibly near to death Tembo might be able to establish himself as the
next president; a prospect almost universally feared throughout Malawi and one
which undoubtedly added a degree of urgency to the various movements for
change that were already underway below the surface of Malawian society.
It was from the Roman Catholic Church, however, that the first public
criticism of the regime inside the country finally came when its bishops
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issued a Pastoral Letter in March. In fact, when in 1989 all teachers frcm
the north of Malawi who were working in the Southern or Central Regions of the
country were suddenly ordered to return to their hone areas without even being
given the chance to harvest the crops they had grown for that year church
leaders "very nearly spoke out" in outrage at such an apparently unjust
measure.34 That nothing was heard from the churches in 1989 showed the
considerable fear which still existed within the country of pursuing any kind
of critical stance towards the government since most Malawians believed that
to do so might well mean their detention or death.35 In addition, y»^ r<= of
propaganda extolling the authority of the piecident and his almost divine
right to rule, which had frequently been heard in many churches throughout the
land, made any public c^tement of concern about the policies of the Banda
iche p?»-Ronally very difficult for many Christian officials.
in ?pite of the general uneasiness of the country's church leaders as regards
a public confrontation with the government the situation had nonetheless begun
to change within the Roman Catholic Church since the Pope's visit in 1989.
John Paul had made references to human rights "as being Integral to the
Gospel" while in the country and, it would seem, had urged the Malawian
bishops to face up to their responsibilities and tackle the major social
issues which concerned the members of their congregations.36 This direct
exhortation from their spiritual leader and the Catholic Church's tradition of
issuing Pastoral Letters touching upon social and political issues in
developing countries were both undoubtedly crucial factors in prompting the
bishops to act as they finally did in 1992 after a period of indecision and
anxiety as to the consequences of such action.37 Moreover, the Pope's
personal interest, as a Pole, in the dramatic events in Central and Eastern
Europe in 1989 and 1990 and his belief that the Roman Catholic Church had made
"an important, even decisive, contribution" to the peaceful collapse of
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camtunism there by its "camutment to defend and prorate human rights" also
impressed the Malawian bishops.38 Finally, during 1991 the Association of
Theological Institutions in Southern and Central Africa (ATISCA) held a
conference at St Peter's Major Seminary in Zcmba. The thane of the
conference, which was attended by a number of influential Roman Catholics
working and teaching in Malawi as well as delegates from other denominations
within the country and throughout the region, was "Pastors for the third
millennium". In the opening address the Rt. Rev. Dr. P.A.Kalilombe emphasized
the need for pastors "to have an adequate understanding of the political
situation of our nations today" so that they could help their congregations
"to find an appropriate political system which guarantees freedom, dignity,
participation, and coresponslbility".39 What was needed, Dr Kalilombe argued,
was a class of church leadership" that is prophetic, disinterested and yet
courageous enough to be able to speak up for justice, freedom and dignity,
even if it has to share in the suffering of the people because of its
ministry".40 These words Influenced the general course of the conference
because in its concluding statement a call was issued for ministers to study
politics and economics and, at the same time, expect to "exercise a prophetic
ministry and by word and lifestyle promote social justice".41 Such a
statement cannot but have stimulated further discussion within the Roman
Catholic Church in Malawi concerning the overall political and economic
situation and strengthened the hand of those calling for action.
However, it would be misleading to seek for the origins of the Pastoral Letter
solely amongst the Catholic Church's upper hierarchy for as one bishop
admitted himself when cementing upon the genesis of the letter: "I did not
write the letter; it was written a long time ago on the hearts of the
people".42 In a very real sense, therefore, the letter should be read as a
reflection of what many Malawian Catholics had been saying to their priests
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privately for years. Nor was such interaction between clergy and laity
confined to the Catholic Church's for a similar process could be identified
within the other denominations "at the grass roots parish level"43 and even
inside the country's major secular institutions. It is only with an
understanding of the nature and extent of this continuous discourse at the
most fundamental level of Malawian society that one Is able to understand the
enormous popularity of the Pastoral Letter.
The available evidence would seem to suggest that the bishops finally decided
to go ahead and make a public statement about the problems facing Malawi in
January of 1992.44 Once the decision had been taken events moved fairly
swiftly for the Pastoral Letter itself was Issued in March for the season of
Lent under the title Living _Our_Faith. The full text of the letter was
expected to be read out in every Catholic Church throughout Malawi on 8 March
although rumours of the letter's existence and Its contents were already
circulating prior to this.45 The leadership of the MCP later criticised the
bishops for not engaging in dialogue with the government before Issuing their
letter but in July of 1993 Archbishop James Chiona of Blantyre Archdiocese
stated that he and his fellow bishops "had tried all they could" to talk with
the government and had even requested an audience with the president but
unfortunately their efforts "bore no fruit", thereby forcing them to write the
letter.46
The text of the letter itself was truly remarkable. In very respectful terms
it recognized many of the achievements of the Malawi Congress Party before
going on to call upon the entire nation to face up to the real problems within
the country including "a growing gap between the rich and the poor with regard
to expectation, living standards and development", "a grossly overcrowded",
understaffed and underfunded education system, an inadequate health service
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and the denial of freedom of expression and association.47 However, it also
included a passage which cut to the very heart of the system of social control
that Banda and his deputies had used to run the country virtually since
independence:
"For too long we have refused to see that, besides the
praiseworthy achievements of the last decades our country still
suffers from many evils . . . People will not be surprised to hear
of these things; they know them. They will only be grateful that
their true needs are recognised and that efforts are made to
answer them. Feeding them with slogans and half-truths - or
untruths! - only increases their cynicism and their mistrust of
government representatives".48
In a few words the insistent propaganda produced by the regime, which had
always claimed that the MCP had "delivered the goods" and had become over the
years a smokescreen behind which everyone could hide their reservations about
the government's mistakes and excesses, was swept away by a clear statement of
reality. Without a doubt the Pastoral Letter was "a moment of truth" for the
entire nation.49
The impact of the Pastoral Letter cannot really be over-emphasised because it
simply was so dramatic. For one thing it potentially undermined the
government's position amongst a significant proportion of the population
because 16,000 copies of the letter were originally printed and distributed
for the edification of at least 1.5 million Catholics.50 What is more.
Catholic Churches were to be found in Malawi in both the urban and rural areas
with the result that even in the villages from where Banda had traditionally
drawn much of his support the people heard that their government was far from
perfect.
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That the bishops had struck a chord in the nation's psyche soon became evident
for the letter was widely greeted "with clapping and ululation" when the
priests read it out.51 In Zomba, for exarrple. at a Baptist Church prayer
meeting in a university house people started to almost weep with joy as they
read through a copy of the letter together.52 Indeed, everyone tried to get
hold of the full text of the letter so that within days photocopied versions
were easily obtainable and being widely circulated. Suddenly Malawians
started to talk much more freely about their country and its government and
serious discussions took place concerning the contents of the letter in
probably most offices in the land.
Initially the ruling authorities appeared undecided as to what to do.
However, when the political leaders did finally take action they failed to
realise, at least at first, the extent to which the bishops had won the
sympathy of so many Malawians. Firstly, the Malawi News declared the letter
to be "poisonous and seditious" while the government made it illegal to
possess a copy.53 Hundreds of people were arrested because they were
suspected of having copies of the letter and a number of reports have
subsequently surfaced of the very poor conditions in the prisons where these
people were detained and of the torture that was inflicted upon some of
them.54 The printing press where the letter was printed in Balaka was fire-
bombed, possibly by members of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), the
government's most powerful para-military force.55 Meanwhile, the bishops,
themselves, faced the resentment and wrath of a party virtually totally
unprepared for any public criticism of this nature. At first they were merely
summoned to Kanjedza Police Station where they were "requested" to explain why
they had written the letter. In fact, this compulsory explanation became an
interrogation which lasted about eight hours as the bishops were forced to
defend the text line by line.56 It would appear, however, that senior members
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of the MCP were not satisfied with this interrogation and at a meeting on 10
March in Lilongwe certain party officials, including Wadson Deleza, the
powerful Minister without Portfolio, made death threats against the bishops.
Unfortunately for the MCP the meeting was recorded by the Malawi Broadcasting
Corporation (MBC) and the relevant tapes were subsequently smuggled out of the
country and later broadcast on Channel Africa in South Africa.57 This alerted
the international cannunity to the fact that the bishops' lives might be in
danger and it has been argued that the "imnediate and forceful international
outcry, particularly from churches"58 did make it difficult for the Malawi
government to harm the bishops although rumours were rife in the country that
they had all been imprisoned when, in reality, they were kept under a sort of
house arrest.59 Nonetheless, the government did manage to exact a certain
degree of revenge by expelling one of the bishops, John Roche, along with
another influential Irish Catholic in Malawi, Fr. O'Malley.60
The government's harsh reaction to the Pastoral Letter sparked off
demonstrations at Chancellor College in Zomba, the main campus of the
University of Malawi. There was some precedent for this since the students
had demonstrated in a very restrained manner in 1989 while some of their
number had been detained in 1983 and academic staff purged as early as the mid
1970's.61 Nonetheless, the university had never been closed in the past
because of serious student unrest and there appeared no prospect of such
action in 1992 prior to the Pastoral Letter and the government's response.
However, the Catholic students at the college were enraged by the veiled
threats that were starting to be issued against the bishops. Consequently, on
Sunday 15 March they organised a march to the Catholic Cathedral in Zcmba in
order to show solidarity with the bishops' cause. According to those who
witnessed it staff at the main hospital in Zomba came out to cheer on the
students. On the return from the cathedral the police decided to arrest a
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number of the students which led to a hastily-convened meeting of most of the
student body at which it was decided to demonstrate on a larger scale the
following day and even march up to the president's official residence in
Zomba. On 16 March teaching was impossible a6 angry students tore up exam
papers and started to mass on the access road to Chancellor College chanting
cries of "multi-party" whilst building temporary barricades. Meanwhile, a
small detachment of the Police Mobile Force (PMF), the government's elite
internal security unit, had taken up a position further down the road thereby
blocking the students' route to State House. It seemed that there might be a
serious confrontation until the college principal arrived in a car and quite
sensibly agreed to close the college a week early. After this the students
quickly dispersed and the tension was dissipated.62
Unfortunately for the authorities this was only the beginning of a series of
events that they seemed increasingly incapable of coping with. Their first
mistake was to try and keep the other main constituent college of the
university, the Polytechnic, open. By closing Chancellor College the
government put about a thousand or so students on the roads and some of them
went straight to the Polytechnic in Blantyre to encourage their colleagues to
begin demonstrating as well. Moreover, since the Polytechnic is near the
centre of Malawi's largest city this was potentially a more serious problem
for Tembo and his lieutenants than the trouble in Zomba. Predictably,
therefore, when the students from the Polytechnic started to stone cars on the
main road and even vandalise a nearby general store the subsequent police
reaction was far less restrained than it had been in Zomba. This time a much
larger contingent of the PMF moved in to crush the riot. Sadly, the police do
not seem to have been correctly briefed as to the precise nature of the
general situation with the result that they made a sweep around the back of
the hostels using tear gas to flush out all the students and then some of the
- 17 -
catering staff who had not been involved in the demonstrations which had taken
place in front of the main entrance of the Polytechnic. By all accounts the
police were very rough with anyone whom they caught and about 70 or so people
found themselves in prison that evening although most of them were later
released.63 In the following weeks the police began "the process of hunting
down the ring leaders of these incidents at both Chancellor College and the
Polytechnic while trouble also erupted at Bunda College of Agriculture,
another of the university's constituent colleges just outside Lilongwe, where
a power cut one evening allowed the students to stone some of the buildings-
Meanwhile, although many students began to fear for their safety the
authorities still allowed the annual national conference of the Student
Christian Organisation of Malawi to go ahead in the capital over the Easter
weekend suggesting that the MCP was not nearly as systematic in its programme
of detentions as it was sometimes made out to be.64
Meanwhile, the Pastoral Letter had a significant impact upon the Malawian
opposition parties outside the country. The exiled opponents to Banda had
been active for years but were divided into different groups and enjoyed
little real support within Malawi.65 However, the growing frustration of the
donor comnunity with the government in Lilongwe encouraged fresh developments
amongst some of the leading exiled Malawians so that in July of 1991 the
United Front for Multiparty Democracy (UFMD) was formed in Zambia while in
December the group published an appeal in Southern Africa Economic and
Political Monthly.66 In fact, a major meeting of "dissidents", as the Banda
regime always described its external opponents, had been planned as early as
December 1991 to take place on 20 March 1992 before the Pastoral Letter had
even been heard of.67 The dramatic events of March inside the country,
however, added a far greater degree of significance to this gathering of over
60 Maiawlan opponents of the MCP at the Intercontinental Hotel in Lusaka for
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what was called the "Prospects for Democracy in Malawi" seminar. The location
of the meeting in Zambia was no coincidence since the new government of
Chiluba was most sympathetic to the deliberations of these men.68 New life
had been breathed into the opposition to Banda, therefore, and this was to
have important consequences in the coming months.
Although press reports at the time concerning the seminar In Lusaka were
largely positive and stressed the common purpose of the participants in their
quest to topple the Malawian government later accounts of the conference have
revealed that there was in reality a considerable amount of disagreement
between the delegates. Apparently, the divisions that emerged concerned the
best strategy to be employed in opposing the MCP with one group advocating an
"inside war" while the other emphasised the need to put external pressure upon
the Lilongwe regime. In addition to this disagreement concerning strategy a
struggle for power seems to have arisen over the future leadership of the UFWD
probably exacerbated by personality clashes and ethnic differences.69
At the centre of this conflict was Chakufwa Chihana, a long term opponent of
the MCP, who had been invited to the seminar along with a number of other
sympathetic Malawians still resident in their own country.70 Chihana had
clashed with the MCP as early as 1962 as a trade union leader since he claimed
that the party was exploiting the urban proletariat.71 He had followed this
act of defiance by leading the last official strike in the country in 1963.72
During the 1970s Chihana was detained for seven years by the government which
provided him with excellent qualifications to help launch a new phase of
direct confrontation with the ruling party should he wish to do so in the wake
of the bishops' efforts.73 Moreover, Chihana was the secretary general of the
Southern African Trades Union Coordination Council, whose offices were in
Lilongwe, and a figure of some substance although it would be true to say that
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the majority of Malawians knew little about him at the start of 1992.
In Lusaka Chihana seems to have championed the policy of internal
opposition to the MCP and it is possible that some delegates became confused
as efforts were made to combine this approach with the option of external
pressure. Whatever the precise nature of the various discussions and debates
it does appear that Chihana was asked by the UFMD leaders on 23 March if he
would agree to be the UFMD's representative inside Malawi. However, according
to certain sources within the Malawian press Chihana rejected this offer
preferring not to be directly linked to the UFMD.74 He now decided, it would
seem, to follow his own policy of direct confrontation with the Banda clique
backed by some of the delegates of the Lusaka meeting who- agreed with his
views - but not by the leadership of the UFMD.75
On April 6 he arrived at Kamuzu International Airport, with the intention of
reading out a prepared statement outlining the excesses of the government and
the need for real democracy, only for the Malawian security forces to bundle
him into a waiting car and take him off to a fresh spell of detention.
However, Chihana had done his ground work well since he had announced over the
BBC World Service before his return to Malawi that he intended to confront the
government with a call for serious reforms and as a result his dramatic arrest
was covered by the international media which promptly condemned it in the
strongest terms possible. Chihana's deliberate stage-managed defiance of the
MCP government was important for two basic reasons. Firstly, it kept up the
momentum for change within Malawi that had been started by the Pastoral
Letter. Secondly, it provided western donors with an excellent pretext for
suspending aid to the country; in effect, Chihana's arrest was the "trip wire"
for the West's final rejection of the MCP and its ancient leader.75 Chihana
was to remain a problem for the government that it appeared unable to solve
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since whether he continued to be detained, was put on trial, or was simply
released his role as a focus for much of the discontent with the regime both
inside and outside the country was embarrassing politically.
Meanwhile the general situation inside Malawi continued to deteriorate during
the rest of the month of April. The government found it necessary to devalue
the kwacha by fifteen percent which was a sign of the strain upon the
economy. More seriously for the authorities, however, was the pressure that
had been building up for pay rises as a result of the Pastoral Letter's
condatnation of the extremely low wages paid by the government and the leading
private ccrrpanies. Feeling the need for some kind of action in order to seize
the initiative from its critics, therefore, the government took the disastrous
decision to offer large pay rises but weighted them in such a way that higher
officials benefitted far more than everyone else.76 At Chancellor College
this decision angered the Clerical, Technical and Support (CIS) staff who only
received a salary increase of as little as twenty percent while the academic
staff took home fifty percent or more. In an unprecedented move the CTS
workers went on strike in protest and brought the college to a halt. The
students, who had not long returned from their extended Easter vacation and
had been forced to sign an undertaking promising not to cause any further
trouble, supported the cause of the CTS employees and started to do some
limited damage to the college in frustration at the failure of the authorities
to provide them with regular food while the strike lasted since CTS staff were
refusing to run the canteen. Oice more the PMF was moved Into position to
seal off campus but this time when the government acted it did so in
overwhelming force. PMF reinforcements were rushed from Blantyre in large
numbers and on 28 April intimidation was used to order the students to leave
campus and return to their homes. In the face of such a dramatic and
threatening display of force the CTS workers agreed to end their strike.77
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Nor did the students in Blantyre follow the lead of their colleagues in Zomba
as they had done previously since their experiences of PMF violence in March
caused them, not surprisingly, to stay out of trouble this time. Nonetheless,
it was clear that a new era in the relations between the government and its
workforce had been reached whilst the paralysis of the university authorities
in the face of the strike reflected the inability of the ruling elite to
handle the new conditions prevailing in the country.
By the beginning of May considerable social tension had built up within the
country although the MCP appeared unaware of the seriousness of this. On 4
May about 3,000 workers at the David Whitehead textile factory in Blantyre
stopped their machines and moved outside to demonstrate for better wages. The
police soon dispersed them but they massed again on the following day so that
the factory had to be closed. On Wednesday 6 May the workers marched towards
the city centre picking up as they went along other members of the urban
workforce who were also calling for higher wages. The demonstrating workers
attracted unemployed youths and some students and together they all confronted
the security forces. When violence erupted between the police and the
marchers all law and order in Blantyre and Limbe dissolved in an explosion of
looting and vandalism that shocked the entire nation. Barricades were
constructed across main roads using flag poles while great piles of stones
were collected to hurl at the police or any approaching vehicles. The rioters
paid particular attention to shops owned by Banda and Kadzamira thereby
proving that most violent unrest in Malawi now had a very definite political
element to it. Moreover, the police's inexperience in dealing with such a
situation caused them to lose control of the centre of Blantyre and it was
only when the PMF started using live amnunition and shooting looters that
order was restored though at the cost of up to roughly 40 people shot dead.78
When the clearing up finally started after the rioters had dispersed the
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extent of the damage became clear with certain parts of Blantyre full of
broken glass and discarded stones but patrolled by units of armed police who
were also deployed in Zomba although no trouble occurred there.79
The rioting soon spread to Lilongwe where Chihana was due to appear at the
High Court to be charged with sedition. A large crowd gathered outside the
court chanting that they wanted to see the "brave man" and when the
authorities failed to produce Chihana people went on the ran^:r in a similar
fashion to the rioters in Blantyre. On 8 May trouble eiuptc^ In Kanengo, a
northern suburb of Lilongwe, but by Llic =>fternoon the police had restored
order to the capital.80 U.-cn on, this sudden spate of urban riots shocked the
establishment and caused the country's only daily newspaper to ask its
readers: "What is happening?"81 Moreover, the president felt It necessary to
make a sort of emergency broadcast to the nation in which he called upon his
people to "express their grievances peacefully and to uphold the peace and
calm, law and order that has been the hallmark of the Malawi nation".82 The
government seemed to be losing its grip upon the country and when the numbers
at the annual Kamuzu Day celebrations on 14 May, the official "birthday" of
the president, were only about 2,000 (most of whom were school children
brought in by the MCP in buses) opposition groups claimed that they were
finally winning the support inside the country which they needed if they were
going to overthrow the Banda-Tembo-Kadzamira ruling clique.83 Nor could the
MCP escape the ever mounting pressure upon it by turning to foreign affairs
for relief since from 11 to 13 May the most important aid donors met in Paris
and decided, partly due to the fierce lobbying of UFMD members, to block all
new aid to Malawi until "substantive progress" was made by the government on
the observance of human rights.84 Although the donor countries agreed to
continue humanitarian aid and provide for the Mozambican refugees inside
Malawi this was a serious blow to Banda and Tembo in a year when the economy.
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already heavily dependent upon foreign aid, was struggling because of the
drought that had hit much of southern Africa in 1992.
THE EMEKENCE OF OPPOSITION GROUPS INSIDE THE COUNTRY: JUNE-DECEMBER 1992
As the government struggled to maintain its hold over the country some
ccmnentators began to cast their eyes upon the army. There was a certain
degree of speculation at the time that if Tembo could not impose himself and
restore normality then "a coup d'etat by the military is a scenario that looms
on the horizon".85 There were some legitimate reasons for the extent of this
speculation- For one thing, reports reached the outside world that at the end
of April 27 senior and middle ranking army officers met the president and told
him that they would not be prepared to undertake policing duties against
citizens calling for democratic reforms.86 In addition, when the students had
first marched in Zomba in March a number of eyewitnesses claimed to have seen
army personnel encouraging the young demonstrators while troops appear to have
refused to Intervene in the earliest disturbances in Blantyre.87 What is
more, there was a tradition of tension between the army and certain elements
within the establishment caused partly by Tembo's desire to expand first the
MYP and then the police as alternative military forces to rival the army-
These moves had been successfully blocked by the army commander, Lieutenant-
General Melvin Khanga, who had managed to win Banda's confidence, although
anger against the Tembo faction was intensified within the military by the
army's deployment from 1987 onwards in Mozambique to protect the Ncala railway
line which naturally involved them in clashes with Rename, the guerrilla force
fighting the government in Maputo, even though it was an open secret that
leading members of the Banda regime, including elements within the MYP and the
police, actively supported the Mozambican rebels.88
- 24 -
The Malawi Army was still only a relatively small force by 1992 of roughly
7,000 men divided into three infantry battalions and one support battalion.89
However, it continued to maintain an air of efficiency and, above all, was
popular with the public to such an extent, in fact, that when troops were seen
in Blantyre during the riots the people cheered.90 It had been the army's
determination to largely keep out of politics that made it so popular because
in 1992 it was still seen by many Malawians as the one institution independent
of the MCP and therefore capable of standing up to Tembo. However, a degree
of uncertainty hung over the future direction of the army in April and May
since Khanga was not well and was clearly coming to the end of his tenure of
command. Given the generally volatile situation in the country this led to a
whole series of rumours that the general had actually been abducted and
tortured by Tembo in order to assure the loyalty of the army. The full truth
surrounding these rumours is difficult to ascertain although it is possible
that Tembo did try to put pressure upon Khanga to back the regime. Indeed, it
has been claimed that in February 1992 Banda formally asked Khanga to support
a Tembo take over of the government but that Khanga rejected the idea saying
that it would have to be ratified by the full military council. According to
this line of reasoning Khanga's retirement as army comrander on 12 June was
not due, as officially announced, to ill health but rather to his stubborn
resistance to Tembo's political machinations.91 So great had the speculation
become over the condition of the general and the feelings of his troops that
Banda felt it necessary to make a special broadcast in July explaining that
Khanga was genuinely ill and made a point of emphasising the need for "mutual
respect and a spirit of partnership between soldiers and civilians".92
Meanwhile, the official media tried to largely ignore the passing of the
country's senior soldier although one magazine attempted to redress the
balance with a small appreciation.93
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Khanga's replacement at the top of the army was his deputy, Isaac Johane, who
came fran Mchinji district near the border with Zambia. Reports in the
western media speculated that he would be even more hostile to Tembo than his
predecessor.94 Certainly Johane enjoyed an enviable reputation in Malawi as a
strong man who had led the army in successful operations against Renamo after
some initial disasters and rumours about his fearless confrontations with
Tembo were legion. However, Johane had only had a very limited education and
it would seem that he did not wish to become embroiled in politics with which
he probably felt extremely uneasy. Moreover, even if Johane had wanted to
take action inside the country in the second half of 1992 he would have faced
the opposition of the head of Intelligence, General Liyabunya, who was a Tembo
man and had been implicated In the elimination of Malawian political exiles
abroad. Indeed, it has been suggested that the delay between Khanga's
departure and Johane's appointment, which worried many at the time, may have
been due to Tembo's attempts to get Liyabunya made army ccnrrander instead of
Johane. What is more, the Banda regime, and more recently Tembo himself, had
made sure that the army had been well looked after. Consequently, the senior
officers probably realised that they might stand to lose a great deal if the
political system in the country changed dramatically and suddenly. In
addition, many of the rumours circulating concerning Johane's independence
were largely false for in reality some of his officers and men felt that he
was too close to the ruling elite.95 In effect, he was probably unduly
influenced by Liyabunya and Major General Manyozo, who was also linked to
Tembo and was later to be accused, along with Liyabunya, of diverting
sophisticated weaponry from army stores to the MYP.96 Whatever the precise
nature of the various machinations within the army events during 1992 appeared
to demonstrate that there was no unified leadership calling for specific
action. Clearly seme middle ranking officers were unhappy with the government
but they were not prepared to act without support from their superiors, which
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was not forthcoming. Nonetheless, the army played an important negative role
in the events of 1992 because Tembo knew that every action he took would be
carefully scrutinised by the soldiers. As a result, the military undoubtedly
helped to restrain the MCP; in effect, the army became a sort of passive
opposition group.97
With the army only a passive spectator the largely loyal police and MYP were
able to move against those elements whan the government identified as
responsible for the disturbances in the country. Thus, the students found
themselves facing an extended absence from classes and the necessity of having
to re-apply for admission if they wished to return to university. These
tactics enabled the authorities to identify those individuals whan they
believed were ring leaders in the demonstrations. At Chancellor College this
lead to a stormy meeting between the academic staff and the college
administration when sane lecturers voiced their concern that students would be
prevented from returning to the university for purely political reasons.
Subsequently, some 60 academic staff signed a petition calling for the
authorities to readmit all students without exception.98 Meanwhile the
students had largely been cowed by the display of force used to disperse them
in April and at least four of them fled to Zambia in June where they were
granted political asylum.99 When Chancellor College reopened for the final
year students only in July all remained quiet; as was the case when the rest
of the students finally made it back to the academic world in September,
although the drought soon disrupted college life by forcing a further closure
due to water shortages in Zomba.100 The full ramifications of the student
troubles earlier in the year could not be entirely brushed under the carpet by
the government, however, for those students who were refused admission decided
to challenge the ruling by taking the university to court, much to the
embarrassment of the vice chancel lor.101
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In the aftermath of the riots and the suspension of international aid the
government tried to follow a dual track policy of giving the impression of
being ready to initiate reform while coining down hard upon potential
opponents. Thus, for example, 17 detainees were released in June and July;
but simultaneously hundreds of office workers with access to photocopiers,
computers, typewriters and fax machines found themselves arrested by the
police as the authorities attempted to halt the dissemination of material
hostile to the MCP and its leadership.102 In fact, Banda had offered
concessions immediately after the riots in a move designed to diffuse national
tension; these had included the ending of the conpulsory purchase of MCP
membership cards if one wished to use a bus or shop in the public markets.
However, these reforms were presented to the people along with a ringing
endorsement of Tembo and Kadzamira which tended to suggest that the reforms
had little significance so far as the authorities were concerned.103
It became clear from June onwards that the MCP had recovered from the initial
shock of the Pastoral Letter, the student action and the riots and was now
trying to re-establish itself using its well-known tactics of propaganda,
misinformation and concealed intimidation. A well organised national
celebration for Independence Day on 5 July, for example, enabled the
government to declare that the noise of the crowd had shamed the
"dissidents".104 National elections in June were also used by the regime to
vindicate their rule even though the turn out was possibly as little as only
ten percent since the people realised that the process of voting remained
largely meaningless given the government's tendency to appoint those MPs who
were not actually re-elected. At the same time the unpredictable manner in
which the establishment dealt with Chihana probably undermined the confidence
of some of the opposition leaders for after being released on bail on 11 July
- 28 -
the now internationally famous champion of democracy in Malawi was detained
once more only three days later.105 Chihana was subsequently released on bail
for a second time on 8 September; but his trial did not finally begin until
November.106 Also in September a joint delegation of Scottish, English and
Malawian lawyers issued a report on human rights in Malawi after considering
evidence and travelling around the country. The final version of their
findings confirmed that the MCP still maintained a strong hold over the
population because, as the lawyers had discovered, the most common emotion
encountered in their travels "from villages to government officials, was
fear".107 Banda and Tembo, therefore, were fighting back and remained
determined to hold on to power. But this retaliation by the MCP was in the
face of an ever-deteriorating economic situation as a result of the suspension
of aid. By the middle of June a further devaluation of the kwacha of over 20
percent took place followed by a freeze on all foreign currency since the
banks simply did not have any. The government was hanging on by the skin of
its teeth in purely economic terms; but the western donors then offered Banda
a lifeline in the form of a bridging loan which allowed the authorities to
prevent the total collapse of the economy-108 Nonetheless, 1992 was "a
nightmare year" for the Malawian economy with inflation reaching 22.7 percent
while rioting in urban areas and sporadic and often unexplained fires cost the
insurance industry over 10 million kwacha.109 Moreover, the suspension of aid
in May meant that the government lost over 270 million kwacha at a time when
the drought was causing severe hardship and the large pay increases were
draining the national reserves.110 The overall effect of all these factors
was "the biggest annual decline (seven percent) in the output of goods and
services (real GDP) since independence".111 The strain upon the entire
economic infrastructure of the country was intense and undoubtedly partly
explains the often apparently illogical and even at times bizarre actions of
the ruling party which must have had to operate in a virtual state of crisis
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for much of 1992 given the serious economic position of the country.
The focus of opposition to the government shifted back to the churches in
June when leaders of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP), the
second largest Christian denomination in the country after the Catholics 112,
along with the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the Church of Scotland
sent a letter to the president on 2 June which was dramatically entitled "The
Nation of Malawi in Crisis: The Church's Concern". Such a move by the
Protestant churches both inside and outside the country was not a total
surprise for the Pastoral Letter had stimulated them to question their long
and none too distinguished support of Banda. For instance, Aaron Longwe, a
CCAP minister, had already been detained for preaching a sermon that very
obviously showed his support for the contents of the Pastoral Letter while the
Church of Scotland had officially declared in May that it was wholeheartedly
behind the Malawian churches in their struggle for Justice and had even
refuted over the BBC Banda's claim to be an elder in the church.113 However,
the June letter was something new since it raised a whole range of issues,
like the Pastoral Letter before it, and so kept alive the call for change
within the country which had been in danger of stagnating in the face of the
government's drive to restore its authority. The text of the letter itself
noted the concessions already offered by Banda and acknowledged the problems
caused by the drought. On the other hand, it pointed out that the president
needed to appoint "a broadly-based Comnission which will enjoy the confidence
of all the people of Malawi" to make specific proposals concerning "structural
reform" of the political system, a review of the judiciary and the just
distribution of income. If this was not enough the letter went on to call
upon the government to end detention without trial, release or try fairly all
political detainees, reform the prison service and allow freedom of
expression.114 The letter was widely circulated throughout Malawi and on 9
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June a petition signed by 57 ministers of the Livingstonia Synod of the CCAP
was issued as a declaration of support for the letter and its contents.115
Unfortunately, the CCAP was divided along regional and ethnic lines since
although Livingstonia in the north and Blantyre in the south endorsed the need
for political reform Nkhoma Synod in the Central Region stubbornly refused to
criticise the government with the result that later in the year the entire
synod was expelled from the CCAP. Aside from this regional split inside the
CCAP, which reflected the very nature of Malawi more than anything else, the
letter of 2 June was crucial to the developing opposition movement since it
restored the momentum for change and helped to further undermine the
government's ideological position, especially in the light of the silence of
the Catholic bishops after the issuing of the Pastoral Letter; a development
caused, perhaps, by the regime's continuing tactics of intimidation.116
Livingstonia Synod now became a power house for national change for in August
it set up a committee to campaign openly for a referendum to be held in Malawi
on whether a multi-party political system should be introduced into the
country.117 The new ccmnittee's brief included organising peaceful
demonstrations to campaign for a referendum and supporting the rights of the
individual through the distribution of literature and political education.
Some of its members were men of impressive sincerity having at the same time
the necessary determination and courage to push ahead with their objectives.
Nor were their efforts to be wasted. The letter of 2 June had not been
entirely overlooked by the government for on 10 June the president announced
that Tembo would be prepared to meet Presbyterian ministers to discuss reform
although when this offer was taken up by certain clergymen they were told that
such a meeting was no longer necessary.118 However, the external pressure
upon the Banda regime had continued late in July when representatives of the
Council of Churches for Britain visited Malawi and encouraged dialogue between
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the churches and the government.119 As a result of these events the reform
party in the CCAP had decided to approach like-minded Malawians throughout the
country in an effort to build a consensus and create the "broadly-based"
ccrrmittee that the open letter of June had recommended. Thus, the
Presbyterians were joined by representatives of the Muslim comnunity, the
business fraternity, the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Christian
Council of Malawi, which had issued its own document in support of the
Pastoral Letter and the CCAP epistle on 26 August 120, the Law Society of
Malawi and the Ecumenical Council of Malawi. At the end of August these
various bodies addressed a joint memorandum to Banda repeating the call for "a
broad based Cemnission ...to deal with all the issues currently facing us" and
stressing the need for dialogue between the government and such a body.121
Ultimately, this group of ccmnunity leaders constituted themselves into the
Public Affairs Ccnwittee (PAC) in September. The PAC saw itself as a vehicle
through which issues could be raised with the government and meaningful
dialogue conducted in the interests of the nation. In addition, it operated
as an umbrella organisation from which other opposition groups could emerge In ,
the future.122 Significantly, it was the first independent political pressure
group to be openly formed In Malawi since the one-party state had been
imposed.
Secular politicians were not prepared to let church leaders take all the
limelight for long and also in September a new political organisation calling
itself the Alliance for Democracy (APORD) emerged. Since the national
constitution did not permit any political parties other than the MCP APORD had
to describe itself as a pressure group although everyone realised it was
nothing less than a new party in its infancy.123 Of course APORD did not
emerge out of a vacuum. In fact, its infrastructure had been in existence for
about a year or so and it was later alleged that Chihana had put the final
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pieces in place at the Lusaka conference in March.124 APORD was basically
Chihana's party; he was its chairman and right from the start he dominated it
to perhaps rather an unhealthy, but probably inevitable, extent which possibly
hindered the development of other leaders within the organisation. More
worrying still was the degree to which Chihana remained so closely in touch
with the western powers so that John Major, the British Prime Minister, for
example, actually faxed him the contents of one of Banda's letters asking for
additional financial assistance and requested Chihana's comnents so that
Downing Street could formulate its policy towards Malawi. Nonetheless,
Chihana stood out as the only leader with enough moral authority to challenge
Banda. One major drawback with APORD, however, was that it drew almost all of
its support from the north of the country. Thus, it could not claim,
initially at least, to represent any kind of national consensus.125
Events in Malawi continued to move "at lightning speed" and although the MCP
annual convention in September traditionally endorsed the one-party system
such a declaration already appeared anachronistic even before the formation of
yet another political body in October. This new political group was the
United Democratic Front (UDF), some of whose members had been part of the
PAC.126 The leader of the UDF was Vakili Muluzi who had been a leading MCP
official in the past and even a minister in the Banda government at one point.
Another senior member of the new organisation was Edward Bwanali, a former
regional MCP chairman and also a cabinet minister at one time. Both these men
tended to be regarded at first as untrustworthy by the average Malawian
because of their former political allegiances which seemed to suggest that
they were opportunists. The UDF also suffered from a severe credibility
problem if it wished to present itself to the Malawian people as a national
party since most of its members came from the south of the country and many
were muslims.127 Significantly, therefore, the new political groupings that
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had emerged tended to reflect the traditional regional and ethnic divisions
within Malawian society.
Although the opposition to the MCP and its ailing leader appeared to have
regained the initiative by the beginning of October Banda and his deputies
were far from beaten. On 18 October Banda stole a march on his opponents by
announcing that there would be a referendum on the future of the one-party
system in Malawi, though he made no mention of the possible date of such a
referendum. He claimed that MCP officials had urged him to hold a referendum
so that they could show "publicly and convincingly that their districts have
rejected the multi-party system of government genuinely".128 This surprising
declaration came only the day before the first meeting between the President's
Ccmriittee on Dialogue (PCD), the body formed by the government to engage in
discussions with its critics, and the PAC thereby relegating the discussion at
the meeting to matters only pertaining to the future referendum for which,the
PAC delegates could not possibly have been fully prepared. However, APORD
immediately welcomed the news subject to certain conditions, Including the
need for an independent referendum ccmnission and the monitoring of the actual
voting by the United Nations (UN) or some such international body, as did one
of the Malawian opposition parties in the United States.129
Naturally, future meetings of the PAC and the PCD were subsequently
overshadowed in the country by speculation concerning the coming referendum
which began to reach fever pitch, especially in the pages of some of the new
papers and magazines that had started to be published as the government
liberalised its attitudes to the media somewhat.130 In fact, prior to the
developments sparked off by the Pastoral Letter Journalism and the rei&jiii^ if
news to the wider public had been controlled almost inclusively by the
authorities through the Malawi Broadcasting Co^^cr=t'ion and two newspapers.
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The Daily Time!, zr.-i The_Malawi__News^ In 1991 a new paper, The FinanciaL Post,
had been launched but it only began to tackle really sensitive political
issues after March 1992.131 However, during the turbulent months following
the Catholic bishops' defiant public criticism of the MCP government a whole
host of new daily, weekly and monthly periodicals appeared on the streets
until by 1993 it was estimated that something like 21 newspapers were in
circulation.132 Suddenly, from having to face one single, pedantic, official
version of events Malawians were swanped with alternatives as they sought to
express themselves in print and debate and describe what was happening in
their country.
Meanwhile, the PAC cancelled its second meeting with the PCD scheduled for 22
October out of respect for the veteran Malawian politician, Orton Chirwa, who
died in Zomba prison. His funeral on 1 November was attended by an estimated
40,000 people including Chihana. This gathering in the north of Malawi gave
an added boost to the pro-democracy movement in the country.133 Further
meetings with the PCD on 11 and 12 of November tackled the topics of violence
and harassment against individuals and a joint statement was agreed upon.134
Sadly, MCP officials continued to make intimidatory speeches and attacks
against supporters of the Chihana faction were not uncomnon. For example, Mr
Msampha Murado, Chairman of the MCP in Lilongwe District, reportedly
threatened the lives of people promoting multi-party democracy in the country
and declared that there was a death squad ichisue) at MCP headquarters ready
for such people. 135 The PAC, however, was unable to compete with the intense
interest generated by the arrival of a United Nations Technical Team which
reached the country in the middle of the month at the request of the
government and stayed for just under a week in order to compile a report on
the implementation of the proposed referendum in Malawi. The subsequent
reconmendations of the UN Team were soon published and largely dwelt upon
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technicalities such as the need for rigorous voter registration and properly
designed ballot boxes. Moreover, though the report did touch upon the obvious
necessity for an atmosphere unmarred by violence and intimidation it made no
mention of the existing laws of detention that made such an atmosphere very
difficult to attain in Malawi.136 Critics soon seized upon these shortcomings
in the report and argued that it allowed the MCP the best chance it could get
of winning the referendum by conducting it in an environment favourable to the
existing regime. As a result, calls were issued by opposition groups outside
the country to boycott the referendum but these fell on deaf ears in the
PAC.137
The behaviour of the MCP throughout the month of December certainly seemed to
suggest that it had decided to take up the challenge of the referendum and use
all the advantages at its disposal to strengthen its position. In fact,
December saw the MCP campaigning for the coming vote in earnest while as early
as the beginning of November the Christian Council had written to the
president expressing their concern that the MCP had already "started
campaigning for votes before the people are adequately educated on why they
have to vote and how".138 Nonetheless, calls were issued by government
officials for the strengthening of the party while the people were warned
throughout the country not to listen to the advocates of multi-party
democracy.139 Even the president got in on the act and "dismissed as lies,
dissidents' claims that the majority of Malawians were no longer behind
him".140 This kind of aggressive campaigning forced the UDF to complain about
the blatant injustices of such behaviour when the pressure groups were not
allowed to campaign. Of course, the MCP denied that it was campaigning at all
but merely carrying out its regular activities. There were few observers,
however, who took such a claim seriously.141
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Clearly, the opposition was at a serious disadvantage and it was suggested
that the different groups should unite in order to offset this and avoid the,
experience of the opposition in Kenya where disunity significantly weakened
it.142. Meanwhile, although Chihana's wife received the Robert F. Kennedy
Human Rights Award in November on behalf of her husband the government still
sentenced him to two years in prison on 14 December, although following a
reduction in his sentence to nine months in March 1993 the defiant opponent of
the Banda regime was finally released on 12 June.143
However, more sinister developments were already underway in Malawi. From
October onwards armed robberies had started to occur. These had been
virtually unheard of in the country previous to this except for the odd
incident near the border with Mozambique connected with civil war there.144
As the year came to an end a spate of such incidents took place throughout the
country so that one newspaper columnist could write of "shops being plundered,
cars being highjacked at gunpoint, bank robberies more akin to novels than
reality and so on".145 The obvious explanation for these events was that the
new peace accord in Mozambique meant that a lot of guns were suddenly
available for idle Malawi an hands. However, there were rumours that some of
these attacks had been arranged by MCP officials in order to discredit the
increasing atmosphere of openness within the country and so prevent the
implementation of reforms necessary for real democracy. These rumours were
later followed up by stories in the independent press of MYP troops taking
part in armed robberies.146 In addition, when the Malawi Army finally moved
against the MYP in December 1993 and forcibly disarmed this para-military
force fresh allegations emerged of huge secret stores of firearms and
airmunition, assassination lists and documents containing plans to destabilise
the country.147 Information also began to circulate, meanwhile, that Tembo
had been using police helicopters to bring arms into Malawi from Mozambique
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across Lake Chilwa.148 In spite of all the events of 1992, therefore the
ailing Banda regime was still determined to hold onto power for as long as
possible regardless of the consequences for the nation.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE EVENTS OF 1992
There can be little doubt that the distribution of the Pastoral Letter by the
Catholic bishops was the single most important factor in setting in motion the
remarkable events of 1992 in Malawi. Secondly, the end of the Cold War meant
that Banda could not count upon support from the West but on the contrary
faced an increasingly hostile group of donor countries intent upon forcing
their own agenda upon Malawi. While we are probably still too close to the
events of 1992 to be able to gauge the full extent and importance of foreign
manipulation in Malawi during the year it is nonetheless clear that this was
also a factor which should not be overlooked. Evidence of foreign
intervention in some of the crucial developments of the year is not hard to
find. The Lusaka seminar in March, for example, was funded by a German
organization, the Frederich Albert Foundation.149 The students, what is more;
were certainly manipulated by foreign governments and opposition groups. The
American Embassy in Lilongwe reportedly encouraged some students to
demonstrate and even offered them scholarships overseas should things become
unpleasant for them in Malawi while one embassy staff member was seen on
campus in Zomba around the time of the unrest.150 Indeed, Malawi has always
been a country that has attracted a considerable number of "visitors" and
expatriates over the years, partly because of Banda's idiosyncratic foreign
policy, some of whose working hours have been spent in clandestine actions
which might be described as spying in more sensational publications.151
Moreover, the opposition groups in Lusaka made no secret of their wish to see
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the students take further action after the first demonstrations.152 Even the
BBC decided to take part in the goading of the student body for Mike Hall made
a somewhat irresponsible broadcast on the World Service in April saying that
everyone was waiting for the Chancellor College students to return from their
extended vacation so that they could continue the struggle against the Banda
regime. Nonetheless, having said all of this there can be no doubt that much
of the student action in March and again in April bore all the hallmarks of
genuine and spontaneous reactions to perceived injustices. ;
External intervention of varying kinds certainly did take place in Malawi
throughout 1992, therefore, but this cannot explain the unprecedented reaction
to the Pastoral Letter. The nation simply did not feel the same after 8
March. The most basic reason for this can only be that the Pastoral Letter
undermined for the first time all the years of MCP propaganda that had been
showered upon the population. Although most people had always realised that
much of this propaganda was simply untrue they had come to accept it, along
with the general state of affairs, as the way things were. The 8 March 1992
transformed all of this by offering the possibility that change was both
necessary and morally imperative and that this could be said in public. In
other words, the Catholic bishops' action gave birth to "a new political
culture" in Malawi which had about it "a romantic quality" precisely because
it was both so novel and, at the same time, quite unexpected.153
The chief failing of the Banda regime was its imposition upon the country of
an increasingly stifling "culture of fear and paralysis...and of self-
righteousness" .154 Banda smothered the nation with his own idiosyncratic
ideas and authoritarian trappings. Although he talked of ending "tribalism"
in the country he nonetheless championed the Chewa, which was resented by the
other ethnic groups inside the country, and, as a result, he failed to create
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the necessary national cohesion. With Chichewa established as the national
language other dialects such as Tumbuka, which had featured in MBC programmes
in the early days of the Banda government, naturally suffered.155 As Banda
grew older he gradually became ever more a creature of habit while his
deputies, in the hope of trying to win his approval, sought to arrange public
functions in precisely the same manner each year. Thus, so-called
"traditional dances" degenerated into one simple dance that became the only
acceptable entertainment at public functions. Dances such as Chopa, H>/ingti,
Chintali and Beni were gradually discouraged at rallies in favour of
"uninformed Mbwtoas" - hundreds of wcrren barely dancing at all as they praised
their president.156
Since most of the leading intellectuals and politicians were imprisoned or
forced into exile this deadening culture was never adequately challenged
ideologically. All the time, meanwhile, Banda constantly kept on talking
about his achievements during the 1950's in his speeches. Whether it was
actually Banda's goal the result of these particular policies was to arrest
the entire nation's social and cultural development. In effect, it was as If
Malawian history had stopped in 1964. With considerable irony, although this
was almost certainly hot intentional, the Deputy Minister of External Affairs
admitted as much when he declared in a speech in parliament in April 1993
while defending his government's record against Intentional criticism, that
"All we have done is to run the country the way we were taught by the
British".157
The whole country was tied down and constricted, therefore, by this artificial
culture of aggressive conservatism. The extent of this restrictive
conservatism could even include eating habits so that Malawians living along
the shore of Lake Malawi were told by their president that they should refrain
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from consuming cassava porridge ikondouole) in order to fall into line with
the majority of the population.158 Not surprisingly, such determined efforts
to establish total social uniformity deadened indigenous cultural development
within many of the different regions of the country while also failing to
build the sort of national identity that a more subtle policy might have
achieved.159 Sadly, but probably inevitably, the culture of the nation
virtually ground to a halt with the result that Malawi did not even manage to
develop its own brand of popular music as did, for example, Zambia or certain
East African countries.160 Indeed, the apparently sudden emergence of so many
new journals and papers after March 1992 should be seen partly as a minor
creative outburst after years of cultural and intellectual restraint. This
argument can be sustained by the appearance of a new school of poetry after
March 1992 which concerned itself largely with the political and social
problems facing Malawi.161 One of the anonymous letters circulated in 1992
accurately assessed the cultural malaise from which the nation had been
suffering when it analysed the MCP's remembrance of those who died in the
struggle for independence:
"It is now twenty five years since Malawi achieved independence,
and it is tempting to allow Martyrs' Day to become a ritual
without thinking about its full meaning. Did the martyrs who died
during the struggle do so simply to become fixed like statues, as
part of a myth which no-one thinks about anymore? Or did they die
for freedom which allows people to think for themselves and to
make their own decisions, not just once, at independence, but all
the time?"162
Naturally, of course, it was not possible to arrest the evolution of the
entire country. Underneath the smothering official culture some change and
development did take place. But it was nonetheless retarded by the prevailing
orthodoxy so that society gave the impression of being almost stunted.
By 1992 there were already signs that the pressures upon the very fabric of
the Banda sub-culture had increased. New social forces were at work that had
gradually undermined the system of social control designed by the MCP to
maintain its power base in the country. The population was growing at a
meteoric rate leading to greater pressure for land and an ever increasing
drift to the urban centres with the result that high density suburbs such as
Ndirande in Blantyre had become potential tinder boxes of mass unrest and
violence simply waiting to be set alight.163 At an even more fundamental
level, however, the traditional foundations of authority within society had
begun to collapse. The extended family, which in the past had frequently
acted as a "cushion" in absorbing many of society's tensions, was clearly
splintering under the pressure.164 Consequently, single parent families,
orphans and street children became issues that required attention and
Intensified social disintegration.165 Serious indiscipline at schools, which
the Pastoral Letter had touched upon, was a clear indication of the
fragmentation of the family structure eind a further source of turbulence
throughout Malawi.166 Oi top of all this was the fear and uncertainty created
by the rapid dissemination of the Aids virus which was assisted by the
increasing sexual promiscuity of the population in the light of the weakening
of the extended family.167 With roughly 46 percent of the population under
the age of 15 it was hardly surprising that one Malawian politician spoke of
the need "to do something about the time-bomb that our youths present
today".168
The response of the nation to the Pastoral Letter and the riots and
disturbances which followed it drew upon all these powerful social forces.
There can be little doubt that some of these problems were the result of the
MCP's incompetence and repressive authoritarianism; but, on the other hand,
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many of them would probably have bedevilled any Malawian government by 1992.
Banda's regime, bereft of ideas and creativity after so many years in power,
simply was not properly in tune with most basic social developments in the
country and lacked the framework to deal with them. When the explosion
finally came the authorities were caught totally unprepared and initially
reacted disastrously, apparently under the impression that the situation they
faced was in no way novel and could be dealt with using their traditional
methods of intimidation and misinformation. However, once the ruling elite
realised that they faced a completely new political and social environment
they began to display a degree of resilience, and some tactical skill, which,
in retrospect, remains surprising. Perhaps, like the entire nation, the MCP
also benefitted from the events after March 1992 ,even though, as the
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